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Introduction
A couple of years ago, I received an e-mail from good long-time friends
whom I met twenty years ago when I was a student at All Nations Christian College in England. They belong to a Protestant church and live in
Scotland. Followig is their letter quoted with some abridgments.
Our church life is very hectic at the moment. At 62 and 65, Keith and I
are the youngest church members apart from one couple. . . . Keith has
a very heavy workload as a deacon, secretary, treasurer, webmaster,
computer operator in services, guitarist, [and] the list just goes on. . . .
When my Grandfather died, it was said that they needed 12 people
to do the work he did, and within a very short while of him dying,
the church closed as no one else could take on what Granddad did.
I fear it would be the same with us if Keith dies before more young
folk come to the church and get involved. We have no youth work
at church as we have no youth. . . . [W]e are a church of old people.
We desperately need some young blood but at the moment, none is
forthcoming. It isn’t helped by the fact that we have one group within
our church that do all they can to keep it as it was in the 1950s. No
youngster wants to come to the sort of service they fight for, and it
makes life very difficult. They have already forced 2 ministers to go as
they are such dominant characters, and all they do is hold the church
back. (Dec 15, 2011)

After I read that letter, I realized that much of it describes my own
church in Russia today. As a fourth-generation Seventh-day Adventist, I

Published by Digital Commons @ Andrews University, 2017

1

60

Journal of Adventist Mission Studies, Vol. 13 [2017], No. 2, Art. 9

have always known my church to be vibrant, full of young people, and a
creative community. I cannot remember a single congregation I belonged
to or pastored that did not have a good group of young people, young
couples, children, and teenagers. Even during the late Soviet era, the local
Adventist churches I knew, visited, and was associated with, with rare exceptions, were full of young people. The mass evangelism of the 1990s created a church that was even younger than what it was like in the Soviet era.
This was in the past, however, and today the picture of the Adventist
Church in Russia is quite different. The church I knew was a community
of young people, but that is no longer the case. Looking at the make-up of
today’s churches in all four of Russia’s unions in the Euro-Asia Division, I
see more and more graying heads and many gloomy faces.
In order to illustrate what is happening, some statistics will be looked
at first, then some interpretations will be discussed before drawing conclusions. In this article I am not trying to blame anybody, but rather attempting to offer help so the Adventist Church can reverse the process of
a slow death.

Demographics Picture of Russia
It is self-evident that the church as a smaller social body is affected by
the larger society. The church, however, has a responsibility for society
(Niebuhr 1946). The gospel invitation is to be given to all (White 1974:102).
To understand the social conditions in which Russian Adventists live and
minister today, it is important to look at the major social changes Russia
has gone through during the last two decades or so. This is important for
navigating future mission initiatives of the Seventh-day Adventist Church
in Russia. The more sensitive the Church is to its social environment, the
closer it follows the Master who said, “Love your neighbor as yourself”
(Luke 10:27).
The following charts demonstrate several major demographic trends
that developed during the 20th century and accelerated at the beginning
of 21st century in Russia. First, by taking a closer look at the larger demographic picture of Russia one is able to come to a better understanding
of the social dynamics which led up to the disappearance of the USSR in
1991and the collapse of the political, economic, and institutional systems
soon after that. Second, the charts help the readers to understand how the
social context in the Russian Federation affects the Seventh-day Adventist
Church’s age and gender make-up. The charts will also help us to foresee
how the social body of Russia will develop in the decades to come and
therefore what the Adventist Church in Russia can expect in the future.
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Figure 1. Population of Russian Federation (in million) Source: Gorshkov and Shereghi
2010:16.

As figure 1 shows, the population of Russia reached its low point in
1946 shortly after the end of World War II, but reached its high in 1992, the
first year after the collapse of the USSR. It is expected that the population
will decrease by 2026 when it is predicted that the population will be 137.1
million, close to the population in 1979.

Figure 2. Increase (decrease) in population of Russian Federation (in million).
Source: Gorshkov and Shereghi 2010:17.
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If figure 2 data is compared with historical events, Russia’s
demographic processes were heavily influenced by social catastrophes
which “repeatedly broke the long-term patterns of populations change”
(Zakharov and Ivanova 1994; cf. Prokhorov 1998; Glotov 2012:36-46). In
1992, for the first time since WWII, the number of deaths in Russia exceeded
the number of births, and with the exception of 1995, that trend has
continued ever since. Deaths were higher than births by almost a million
people in 1994-1995 and in 1999-2003. The birth rate dropped sharply in
periods of economic crises in 1962-1969 and 1992-1999. The collapse of
the USSR, followed by drastic economic reforms triggered demographic
disasters. For the first time in its millennial history, Russia was labeled a
“disappearing” country (Rudenko 2007). As Eberstadt observes, over the
two decades since the Soviet collapse, “the country’s population has been
shrinking, its mortality levels are nothing short of catastrophic, and its
human resources appear to be dangerously eroding” (2011:95).
Eberstadt explains Russia’s gruesome deterioration as follows:
Although the country’s problems with infectious diseases―most
alarming HIV/AIDS and drug-resistant tuberculosis―are wellknown, they account for only a small fraction of the awful gap between Western and Russian survival rates. Most immediately, the
country’s fateful leap backward in health and survival prospects is
due to an explosion in deaths from cardiovascular disease and injuries [which] account for the overwhelming majority of Russia’s spike
in mortality levels from those of Western countries. At the moment,
death rates from cardiovascular disease are more than three times as
high in Russia as in Western Europe, and Russian death rates from
injury and violence have been stratospheric, on par with those in African post-conflict societies, such as Liberia and Sierra Leone (2011:98).

In 2005, the Russian government launched a new demographic initiative which was entrusted to Dmitriy Medvedev, who was at that time the
Vice Prime Minister in charge of national projects and priorities (Latsa
2012). The idea behind this initiative was to boost the country’s birth rate
and lower mortality rates. Starting on January 1, 2007 the government began paying maternity capital (family subsidies for mothers of more than
one child, if the second child and any further children come after January 1, 2007). In 2007, the amount of the lump sum allowance was 250,000
rubles (about $6,820) for the second child and any additional children and
was indexed against inflation, reaching 429,408 rubles (about $11,720) in
2014 (Pension Fund of the Russian Federation 2014).
This however did not reverse the demographic situation, and as of 2012,
the death rate was still higher than the birth rate (Federal State Statistics
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Service 2013). Only in 2013, for the first time in the last two decades did the
population increase from January to November 2013. Within 11 months,
there were 1,743,300 births which is 22,700 more than the number of those
who died (Ministry of Labor and Social Protection Report 2013).

Figure 3. Difference between births and deaths in number of population in Russian
Federation (in thousands). Source: Gorshkov and Shereghi 2010:18.

According to statistical predictions, starting from 2008 the percentage
of the population that crossed the line of the “able-bodied age” (retirement) will double, from 21% to 42% in 2050 (Osipov and Rybakovsky
2009:250). This means that the burden to support elderly people will inevitably increase taxes on the younger generations, and the rising life expectancy in Russia will make this burden even heavier and worsen the
pension crisis (Putin 2007:7).

Figure 4. The median age of population in Russian Federation (in years). Source:
Gorshkov and Shereghi 2010:19.
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It is also important to understand that the decrease in the number of
young people in the population is not an independent process but a part
of the larger depopulation of Russia in general (Semenova, Tvanova, and
Dabrouina 2005:318-361). Russian society shares in the “global aging” phenomenon, a phenomenon indicating “a fundamental demographic shift
with no parallel in the history of humanity” (Jackson and Howe 2008:3).
The median age in Russia will rise by almost two days every week, from
38.7 years in 2011 to 42.4 years in 2025. Accordingly, Russians who are 65
and older will make up almost 19% of the population in 2025, compared
to 13% in 2011 (Eberstadt 2011:102). Within eight years, from 2013 to 2021,
the number of young people aged 14-30 will decrease by about 8 million
(see fig. 5), which is over a half of the population of Moscow.

Figure 5. The number of population aged 14-30 in the Russian Federation and prognosis
until 2021 (in million). Source: Gorshkov 2010:15.

Against this background of the Russian demographic picture, I next
look at the growth rate of the Adventist Church in Euro-Asia, primarily in four Russia-based unions, the West Russia Union Conference, the
East Russia Union Mission, the Caucasus Union Mission, and the Far East
Union Mission of Churches.
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Figure 6. Euro-Asia Division of the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists.
Source: General Conference of the Seventh-day Adventists, Office of Archives, Statistics, and Research 2017.

Demographic Developments of the
Adventist Church in Euro-Asia
First, I will look at the Euro-Asia Division membership growth rate
from 1991 to 2013. As someone who was born in the Soviet Union and who
grew up being a Seventh-day Adventist, I never heard any preaching in
the church that envisioned the collapse of Marxism-Leninism and the disappearance of its grand political creation, the USSR. Neither did I hear this
topic mentioned in any private conversations, nor did I ever see anything
from the Bible or the writings of Ellen G. White applied in any way to even
hint that one day soon the mega-project of Communism would collapse
without a single shot being fired. However, this was exactly what happened in 1991 when in a twinkle of an eye many people in the USSR and
its satellite partners encountered a dire reality, utter misery, and existential emptiness. To use a well-known image from Jesus’ parable that I used
in another publication “the rags and dirt on the body of the prodigal son
[is] a picture of post-Marxist Russia” (Drumi 2008:164). It is against this
background that one needs to interpret the rapid growth of the Seventhday Adventist Church during the early post-Soviet years (see fig. 7).
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Figure 7. Church membership growth in ESD, 1991-2012. Source: General Conference of
Seventh-day Adventists, Office of Archives, Statistics, and Research 2014.

Figure 8. ESD growth rate, 2005-2015. Source: General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, Office of Archives, Statistics, and Research 2017.

What was the main reason for the rapid if not phenomenal church
growth among Seventh-day Adventists in Russia in those days? By the
1980s, the growing inadequacy of the Russian version of the Marxist ideological paradigm became evident to the political elite led by then president Gorbachev of the Soviet Union. Many of the reforms that were initiated during the period of perestroika resulted eventually in the collapse of
the Soviet Union in 1991. Not surprisingly, two surveys done in Russia
in 1990 and 1991 demonstrate that the “rapid growth of religiosity and
just as rapid ruin of mass atheism” went hand in hand in Russia (Furman
1992:7).
However, to say that religious faiths replaced atheism would be an exaggeration. The disillusionment with Marxism-Leninism did not lead the
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masses to embrace an actual practicing of religion (Shterin 1998). It is also
true that from around 1997, interest in a religious life began a steady decline. In the first half of the 1990s, the rate of church attendance across the
Russian Federation was no more than 6-7 percent of those who claimed
to be believers (Kaariainen and Furman 1997:36-38). The worldview of
Russians did not suddenly become “religious,” “Christian” or “biblical.”
Rather, it became more eclectic and controversial, allowing old atheistic
clichés to coexist with the emerging new patterns of thought (38).
During that same period when the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC)
was gradually filling an ideological niche, the conditions for non-Orthodox denominations to operate in Russia worsened. The Russian government reaction to the supposed threats from foreign sects and various isms
led to the development of protectionist ideologies (Balmforth 2011). The
dominant role of the ROC was legitimized when Russian president Boris Yeltsin in September 1997 signed legislation that recognized only the
Russian Orthodox Church, Islam, Buddhism, and Judaism as “traditional
religions” (System Garant 2013). Later amendments to that legislation
introduced between 1997 and 2013 further narrowed opportunities for
conventional methods of evangelism used by “non-traditional” religions,
particularly Protestant ones. The amendments reflect a strong move by
the government toward implementation of the “spiritual security” policy
as an important subset of the national security concept of Russia (Elkner
2005).
Taking a closer look at figure 7 it appears that the excitement created
through public evangelism―that the world is coming to its end―lasted
probably only 10-11years (from 1991-2003). The sudden increase in church
growth slowed after reaching its peak in 2003, a downward trend that
continues to this day. In the years that followed the collapse of the Soviet
system, mass evangelistic campaigns had been initially well received and
resulted in rapid church growth with most of that growth experienced in
regional and district cities. By the end of 2003, the church membership in
the Euro-Asia Division reached its highest point, increasing from 37,388
in 1990 to 144,760 (in the Russian Federation, from 8,666 to 45,000). In the
late Soviet years, the majority of Soviet Adventists lived in the Ukraine
and Moldova.
The tide started to turn in 2003 with a steady decrease in membership since that time. By the end of 2013, the membership of the ESD totaled 117,028. If compared with 2003, there was a drop of 27,732 or over
20 percent. Moreover, according to the ESD Secretary’s Statistical Report
Analysis, from 1990 to 2011 the Adventist Church baptized 293,131 people
(ESD SSRA 2013a:3). However, during that same period the Church also
witnessed a great loss of members (as listed below).
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Several things stand out as one looks at those numbers. First, the reasons for the large number of dropped/apostatized/missed members has
not been analyzed in a comprehensive way. To the best of my knowledge,
no in-depth study has been done in the ESD as to why so many people left
the church between 1990 and 2011. The two international surveys among
former and inactive church members conducted under the leadership
of the General Conference Nurture and Retention Committee from 2011
through 2013 (Sahlin 2013; Kent 2013) did not shed any light on the specific situation in the Euro-Asia Division.
Nevertheless, two indicators from the survey conducted by Monty
Sahlin might provide keys to better understanding the situation regarding
dropouts in the Euro-Asia Division. First, he points out that 66 percent of
those who left the Adventist Church were people from 18-29 years of age
(37%) and 30-39 years of age (29%). Most of them were within the category
of “youth.” Second, 83 percent of those who left the church had never attended an Adventist school (Sahlin 2013). It seems that there is some correlation between these two findings. It may well be that the greatest failure
of the Seventh-day Adventist Church in Euro-Asia in the 1990s and early
2000s was a lack of appreciation of the importance and missional value of
Adventist education as a long-term mission strategy. Hardly anybody in
those days could foresee that the Russian government would change its
attitude toward private (religious) schools (that is, kindergarten to 11th
grade). Starting from September 2012 onward the government started to
provide considerable financial support to private schools.
For example, during the 2013-2014 school year, the government subsidy of Zaoksky Christian School of the General Education (an Adventist school
operated by Zaoksky Theological Seminary) amounted to 40 percent of
the school operating budget (Bychkov 2014). Unfortunately, there are
presently only two Adventist schools in the territory of the Russian Federation eligible to claim such benefits from the government—the one in
Zaoksky and another in Tula. Had there been more schools established
in the 1990s and early 2000s, and had there been a strategic focus on Ad-
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ventist education for children rather than focusing only on new baptisms,
today’s statistics would most likely be different.
Second, the number of those who died is close to 40,000, or an annual
rate of about two percent of the total church membership. This means that
the death rate within the Adventist Church has been twice as high as that
of the general population in Russia (see fig. 3). In other words, this index
indicates that the age of church members is older than that of society in
general.
Third, there is a steady emigration of Adventists into other countries
outside the Euro-Asia Division, mostly to North America and the European Union. From 1990 to 2011, 13,535 transferred their membership to
other countries. The sad thing about this emigration is that among those
who left the division were a number of key intellectuals and pastors. This
“brain-drain” has hurt the church because it has not been able to regain
the intellectual capital it used to have.
Because of the above factors, between the 2005 and 2010 General
Conference sessions the church leadership in the ESD launched an allESD program of reclaiming church members. As part of its “Come Back
Home” initiative the Church emphasized pastoral visitations and the establishment of friendly relationships. After the first stage was completed
in 2013, the Church was able to reclaim 2,913 church members but unfortunately 16,569 members withdrew their membership (Euro-Asia Division 2013a:8-9, 13).
Two more things need to be pointed out in this context. As figure 7
shows, the turning point from good to poor church growth coincided with
the decline of the youth population in Russia (fig. 5). Second, the beginning of the declining membership trend coincided with the downward
enrollment trend at Zaoksky Adventist Seminary and Institute (fig. 8),
an educational institution run by the Euro-Asia Division since 1988. As
can be seen from figure 9, starting from the 2003/04 school year when the
number of on-campus bachelor students in the Zaoksky Adventist Seminary and Institute was the highest—close to 300 students—from that point
on there has been a clear downward trend. The negative trend has not
been reversed in spite of unprecedented financial support provided to the
institution by the Euro-Asia Division in the way of scholarships. Unlike
the 1990s when there were large numbers of young people eager to get a
Christian education and when many of them were short of money, today
it is just the opposite. There is money available but a significant lack of
young people willing to use it to take programs offered on the campus of
Zaoksky.
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Figure 9. Enrollment trend (Bachelor, on-campus programs) in Zaoksky Adventist Seminary and Institute (ZASI). Source: Zaoksky Adventist Seminary and Institute, Enrollment
Office Report 2013.

One of the questions that needs to be asked is What went wrong? Did
the church do anything wrong or what happened in society? To answer
the above questions I would say that probably things have changed both
within the Church and in society. As more Russians experienced exposure
to material affluence and a lifestyle of a developed country, consumerism
became the new ideology of Russia. As Golova points out, an entrenchment
of consumerism through a system of control over consumerist behavior
has led to an internalizing of “the values of the consumerist society and
[the] creating [of] a new formation: an active and manageable consumer”
(Golova 2011:91). As she concludes, the “inertia of our culture has been
broken, and the Russian nation is now oriented to consumption” (102).
As Russia entered the orbit of capitalism and unrestricted wealth, it
had two effects on the country’s population. Besides improving the economic conditions of the population, it caused people to idolize wealth.
In light of Jesus’s remark that it is the pagans who fall prey to consumerism (Matt 6:31-33), the new lifestyle that Russians so quickly acquired
was pagan and paganizing (Hirsch 2006:111). In Russia, the Orthodox version of the Christian faith has been gradually re-adopted by the state as a
new ideology, thus filling the vacuum left after the disillusionment with
Marxism-Leninism. This new ideology, however, has deviated from such
key values and images of the gospel as the narrow gate and the difficult
way (Matt 7:13, 14), the need to lay up treasure in heaven and not on earth
(Matt 6:19, 20), taking up one’s cross and following Jesus (Matt 10:38), and
not following Caesar.
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How did these shifts affect the church? As one looks back at the developments of the 1990s and 2000s, one soon realizes that Russian Adventists
were too slow to change and adapt to the fast changes that were taking
place in the social, spiritual, and intellectual realms of Russian society.
Nobody taught us that adaptation and reshaping was necessary because
of the changing social and spiritual landscape. Too many thought that any
change was compromise. Somehow, we came to believe that “the present
truth” works automatically, simply because it is “the truth.” We underappreciated how competitive the “spiritual market” would become in a
matter of a few years and how fast people would gain self-respect and
critical eyes as to what to believe, which church to attend, which books to
read, etc.
In the days of mass evangelism when a certain euphoria was imported
by foreign evangelists, we became “number-possessed” trying to achieve
the highest numbers of baptisms in the shortest time possible. Sadly, the
quality of those baptisms left much to be desired, and the social body of
the Church could not and did not “digest” the numbers of newcomers
properly. It may have well been that the strategy of “advancing the message” by producing new baptisms was implemented at the expense of
growing churches that would be sound spiritually and healthy socially.
Perhaps, we as Russian Adventists relied too heavily on the quality of
spiritual bread baked on other continents and did not dare to offer our
own recipes to bake a bread with Russian flavors in it. The more society
changed the more we were alienating ourselves from it, and the more foreign we became as a religious group of people in Russian society. By an
extreme emphasis on the “immanent end of the world” at the expense
of being sensitive to the social needs of the society (for instance, its deep
need of morally sound and academically strong education for children)
we became more “unique” but less understood by the surrounding culture.
The dominant theological reasoning of those days was keeping the truth
rather than offering the truth. In other words, by keeping the truth we wanted
new comers to reproduce what we did as we had kept the truth in our
semi-underground Soviet existence. It is true that the keeping the truth
paradigm worked perfectly well during the decades of persecutions and
did help the church remain close to its message. The message did have a
liberating power in the lives of the believers. Later, however when freedom of expression was restored, the concept of keeping the truth became an
obstacle. As the new Russian society emerged around us, the members of
the Church did not know how to become more sensitive to the surrounding culture, and thereby did not produce a more nuanced approach to
mission in a rapidly changing society. In the hidden and sometimes open
clashes between the old keeping the truth paradigm and the emergence
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of the new reality, the Church made theological gains but lost missiologically. For example, at times the issue of right belief became more important than obeying the commandment to “love your neighbor as yourself.”
In other cases, the issue of having a strong administrative and financial
structure was more important than following Jesus’ teaching about receiving sinners and helping them grow and become disciples. There was also
the issue of maintaining the right interpretation of Daniel and Revelation
to the point that it became more important than teaching about following the Sermon on the Mount in everyday life. As a result, probably the
greatest missiological failure was that by trying to keep the truth Adventists
gradually developed a self-protective, semi-closed mentality and thereby
hindered the development of an externally focused mission.

Youth in the Adventist Church in the Russian Federation
There are four unions of the Seventh-day Church in the Russian Federation today: the West Russian Union Conference (WRUC), the East Russian
Union Mission (ERUM), the Caucasus Union Mission (CaUM), and the Far
Eastern Union of Churches Mission (FEUCM) (fig. 10). With insignificant
exceptions, the territorial borders of the four unions follow the administrative borders of the Federal Districts (FD) of Russia. WRUC includes
Central, North-Western, Privolzhskiy, and Ural FDs; CaUM includes the
Southern FD; ERUM includes the Siberian FD; FEUCM includes the Far
Eastern FD. If taken together, the four Russian unions comprise about half
of the 117,028 church membership of the Euro-Asia Division.

Figure 10. Four Russia-based unions of the Seventh-day Adventist Church. Source: General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, Office of Archives, Statistics, and Research
2014.
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Due to the numerous territorial reorganizations that took place in the
1990s and early 2000s, the membership statistics in each of the four unions
is somewhat fragmentary and available with varying degrees of precision.
To track the yearly growth patterns for the same timespan as has been
done for the Euro-Asia Division is beyond the scope of this paper. At this
point, suffice it to say that church growth/decline in the four Russia-based
unions reflects the dynamics seen in the Euro-Asia Division in general.
In the following section, I will first compare the number of young people living in the territories of the Federal Districts of the Russian Federation (coinciding with the corresponding unions) to the general population. Second, I will compare the number of baptized young people (16-30
years of age) in each of the unions to the total membership in those unions.
Third, I will compare the proportion of young people in all four Russiabased unions to the proportion of young people in the Russian Federation.
This will give a better understanding of the demographic conditions of the
church as compared to the demographic conditions of society.
Two additional things need to be stated at the outset. First, the total
membership in each of the unions does not coincide with the number of
those who actually attend church on a given Sabbath, for attendance is
lower than the membership. Take, for example, the WRUC as the largest
(in terms of membership) among the four Russia-based unions. As of the
fourth quarter of 2013, there were 29,361 church members. The number of
those attending Sabbath School was 18,155 on the second Sabbath of the
quarter and 18,661 on the seventh Sabbath of the quarter (WRUC, Sabbath
School and Personal Ministries Department Report 2014). That means that
roughly one-third of the official members did not attend church at all.
Second, there is a small, and I believe, acceptable statistical error in the
following calculation. Prior to 2011, not all statistical data regarding young
people was properly collected in the unions and it is therefore unavailable
for comparison. Therefore, the comparison I make will be between the
numbers of young people in the country as of 2009 and the numbers of
young people in the four Russia-based unions as of 2012.

Youth in Russia vs. Youth in the Russian Adventist Church
As of 2009, there were 33,009,000 young people aged 15-29 in Russia,
which is 23.3% of the general population of the country (UNICEF 2010:9).
The number of young people living in the four Federal Districts (FD) covered by the WRUC (including Volgograd and Astrakhan regions) was
23,703,000 or 23.4% of the population in those Federal Districts (UNICEF
2010:11, 12). As of 2012, the number of young people in the WRUC was
3,614 or 12% of the membership which stood at 30,011 (Euro Asia Division
2013b). This percent is 1.94 times less than the percent of young people in
the population in the four Federal Districts.
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In the same manner, if similar calculations are made for each Russianbased union in correlation to the population in their respective Federal
District(s), it results in the following percentages of baptized young people compared to the number of young people living in the their respective
territories.

*with the exception of Volga and Astrakhan regions

If the data for all four Russia-based unions are summarized, the percentage of young people to the general membership in the four Russia-based Unions
is less than half the percentage of young people to the general population of the
Russian Federation.
This index should create deep concern among church leaders, pastors,
and educators because it states that the Seventh-day Adventist Church
in Euro-Asia is graying much faster than the Russian population in general, a population already considered old (Jackson and Howe 2008:3). In
Russia, the retirement age for males is 60 and for females is 55, and the
number of people in this age category or older is 13 percent of the general population, that is, 6 percent above the mark of 7 percent accepted as
borderline between young and aging population. That means that every
8th person in Russia is older than 65. Within the Seventh-day Adventist
Church in Russia that percentage is even higher, meaning that the Church
is an old and further aging social body within a rapidly aging Russian society.
The general statistics collected at the local church and reported to the
higher church administrative levels are not separated by age and gender.
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From our analysis above this would be of significance to show who is coming in or leaving the church. To the best of my knowledge, the age profile
of the church has never been analyzed in-depth and discussed publicly
during church business meetings that I have had a privilege to attend.
But it appears that such membership accounting would be vital for the
planning and establishing of programs, especially to attract young people.

Socio-Theological Reflection
According to Paul, the church is Christ’s body (1 Cor 12:27). Is this a
theological statement only or can it be interpreted sociologically as well? In
my opinion, the latter is just as acceptable as the former. All who saw Jesus
when he walked on this earth remembered him being a thirty-year-old
male (Luke 3:23). Those who watched him dying on the cross remembered
him being a thirty-three-year-old man. Other ages of Jesus in the Gospel of
Luke mention him as a one-day and eight-day-old baby (Luke 2:7, 21) and
as a twelve-year-old boy (Luke 2:42). As Jesus was shaping the nucleus of
his religious movement, he surrounded himself with men and women of
his age or close to it. Perhaps it was because of the itinerant nature of his
mission and the demanding lifestyle that went with it. Youth seemed to be
at the forefront of the early church mission. A good example was “a young
man named Paul” (Acts 7:58; italics added).
The Jewish religious establishment struggled to accept Jesus who
boldly proposed a rejuvenation of the Jewish religion as well as liberation of people from spiritual decline. Religious leaders of that time criticized Jesus, saying, “You are not yet fifty years old” (John 8:47). Thus, they
showed their inability to embrace new thinking and realign the spiritual
and theological values of their own religion. The novelty of Jesus’ teaching and freedom of his behavior could not and did not fit the dead religious forms. Old wineskins could not contain new wine. This resulted in
the death of the Messiah and the tragic historical divorce of Judaism and
Christianity.
Although it is true that history repeats itself, it is equally true that it
does not have to do so. As one looks beyond Paul’s metaphor and takes
into consideration the demographic picture of Seventh-day Adventists in
Russia, two questions come to mind. First, figuratively speaking, What happened to Jesus’ young body, that is the Church that claims to be that body?
Second, What can be done to rejuvenate the Church’s youthful potential?
The demographics picture of the Seventh-day Adventist Church in
Russia shows that there is a dangerous lack of “young” followers of Jesus
in the many Adventist congregations and companies scattered throughout
Russia. True, there is no way for the Seventh-day Adventist Church to stop
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or reverse the “global graying” trend. Neither is it the Church’s mission.
On the other hand, silently sitting by is not acceptable for a church eagerly
seeking to bring the Good News of Jesus to every corner of the world.
As time goes by and if Jesus does not return soon, Adventism in Russia
will find itself at a critical crossroad. The options Russian Adventism has
can be reduced to either retract or to rethink itself. The first option will
cause Adventism to be even less flexible toward local cultural contexts
and more vulnerable in the face of current and looming challenges. If Adventism wants to survive and be relevant in Russia it will need to become
more aware and flexible toward the local cultural environments and less
monolithic and homogeneous. Neither option is an easy one.
The first option will further stagnate the movement that used to be vibrant and appealing to the public. A rigid church will lose touch with the
radical changes that have occurred in society during the last two decades.
Those events have changed how people think, feel, behave, communicate,
socialize, and who they really are, culturally, socially, economically, politically, and existentially. I believe that a preoccupation with prophetic
charts and schemes at the expense of ignoring the fast changing cultural
and demographic landscapes in the Russian Federation has contributed to
the shrinking of the Adventist Church in Euro-Asia.
Notice what young Russians (age 14-30) usually do in their leisure
time:

Figure 11. Sample of leisure activities of young Russians. Source: Gorshkov and
Shereghi 2010:196-197.
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One of the implications of the above picture is that religion and church,
if presented to young people in an abstract way (as a concept, theory, or
ideology) will not be understood by most young people, and will be even
less appreciated and acceptable. A far better focus of the church’s mission
would be to help people encounter God rather than the distribution of
knowledge about Him. There is no other option for the church but to follow Jesus in meeting people where they are mentally, socially, virtually,
and even physically.
If Adventism in Russia fails to interact in creative ways with local cultural contexts and does not produce locally appreciated patterns and practices of spiritual life, its members will become poorer and poorer intellectually, spiritually, and socially. The present methods of Adventist mission
in Russian will only continue to attract people of a certain mindset, mostly
elderly and retirees, but will close the doors for many others. “Fitting”
in this context, is not a matter of moral choice and morality as such but a
mental worldview picture the church generates and offers to spiritually
thirsty people. If Adventism resists rethinking itself and prefers to keep
reproducing itself in the exact forms and meanings of a 19th century eschatological movement, the church will be diminished in its relevance and
eventually in its existence.
The danger of having old missiological clichés in presenting a “young
Jesus” are two mutually exclusive and incompatible things, and the sooner the church realizes that the better it will be in the long run. To some
extent, the preaching of the “soon coming of Jesus” and the “three angels’
messages,” that is, a message about a new, otherworldly reality violently
breaking into this world order may have also led to the decline of youth
in the church. A message about heaven sounds appealing for people who
have already lived their lives on earth and who do not expect much more
in this life. The idea of the soon coming of the Kingdom of God was very
attractive in Russia when people suffered and were persecuted, but that
message has lost its appeal for those who have just begun to live and mature and who want to experience life in all its fullness. A message of heaven does not provide answers to the challenges of daily life. If the message
continues to keep its focus on transcendent issues of highly speculative
theology and fails to touch people where they are, the result will be no
better than what the church is experiencing today.
The worldview paradigm of nineteenth-century Protestant America
into which Adventism was born and shaped, and the highly different
worldview that Russians have created today, is so different that it is time
to rethink and reformulate the Adventist identity and message. If Jesus
Christ is the same yesterday, today, and forever (Heb 13:8), why not try to
understand him and his gospel anew, in Russia through Russian eyes? It
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is vital to decode Adventism and let God’s Spirit produce locally understood and appreciated religious meanings. By avoiding open conversations and honest discussions in formulating such a relevant and culturally-accepted message may result in the church becoming an obstacle in
God’s mission instead of being its agent.
A second option, in which Adventism rethinks itself, is by no means an
easy task. There is no such thing as shapeless truth. Religious truth that
remains in the forms and rituals (including verbal formulas and methods
of theologizing) of a bygone era and people in their 70s has the potential to create conflict and misunderstanding between older and younger
generations, between archaic and modern worldviews, between modern
and post-modern, faith and knowledge, universal and local, Western and
non-Western, and between propositional truths and truths hidden in narratives, etc.
Perhaps, it would be helpful, in the context of Russian Adventism facing a demographically tough future, to introduce a concept of “emerging
Adventism” and let it coexist with the conventional “growing Adventism.” In my view, this change offers some hope that, if enough thinking,
thoughtful discussion, theological research, and prayers are given to the
issue, the church will be able to redefine itself and be better prepared for
the next historic era that may last longer than we expect.
To achieve such a goal and re-define Adventism will require that there
be among other things, (1) a common understanding of what has gone
wrong, (2) a genuine desire for biblically acceptable change; (3) patience
to listen to and accept others regardless of their different views; (4) honest conversation about what has become theological “sacred cows.” This
will eventually lead to the reformatting of Adventism in a way that allows
it be more locally sensitive and spiritually responsible for the name and
message it bears.
If one dares to offer some suggestions as to what needs to be done to
help Russian Adventism face its demographic challenges, several important steps should be taken.
First, we urgently need to have an open, honest, and frank discussion
about the methods and approaches the church has used over the last two
decades of religious freedom. The wider this discussion is, the more painful the process will be. Yet the church has neither the time nor the moral
resources to allow anything less than that. It is time to listen to local pastors, elders, and church members and let them speak, as the Spirit would
tell them to speak. This discussion, I believe, will lead to a careful analysis
of what has gone wrong in the past and what might be a long-term strategy of finding a way out. It is naïve, however, if not arrogant, to expect the
Spirit to answer questions that we already know the answers to.
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Second, it is time to have a long-range family and child/youth policy
in the Seventh-day Adventist Church in Russia for the next 20-30 years.
Helping young Adventist parents, especially those who have many children, to rear them in a Christian way must be considered as the missionary work. This demands the heavy and systematic support by the church,
including the use of tithe monies. From a priority, family and children/
youth work must become the priority of the church’s mission. If youth
is not the focus, in twenty years the results will be much worse than the
picture we see today that is itself the result of twenty years of significant
under-appreciating the importance of these areas.
Third, it is time to include in church statistical reports age and gender
information of church members in the local church, mission/conference,
union, and division. This is not something difficult to achieve, but statistically speaking, this will help present a much better understanding of the
demographics of the Seventh-day Adventist Church in Russia. Here is a
sample of what can be done by the church in terms of getting more accurate information about itself:

Figure 12. Age and sex structure of Russian population as of January 1,
2012 (males left side, females right side). Source: Federal State Statistic Service 2013.
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No doubt, if such a demographic distribution chart of the Russian
Seventh-day Adventist Church were made today, it would provide an
eye-opening bit of information for all levels of the church organization.
Just numbering baptisms and charting that information has become misleading and does not show the real picture. The church should take much
more seriously the aging population of its members. If accurate statistics
were available the church could then compare the percentage in each age
bracket with the life expectancy charts for the various regions of Russia.
There is another issue that should cause concern: Most of the money
given to the church is provided by elderly people who strongly support
the church structure, church projects, church institutions, and church
workers. According to a survey conducted by the Ministerial Association
of the ESD in the fall of 2011, almost 80% of the local churches have a
membership where the number of female church members is 70% and
higher (Euro-Asia Division 2012). The church organization and its workers need to realize that they are primarily supported by one of the most
vulnerable and often least protected social groups in Russia, namely babushkas (old women).
Fourth, a one-size-fits-all approach to mission has completely exhausted its potential. The older a person becomes, the more receptive they
are to an eschatological message. However, the younger a person is, the
higher the importance attached to a message of hope for life here and now.
An eschatological message helps older people face their future encounter
with death without fear and panic; a message of hope for the present gives
meaning and fulfillment to life here in this world. As mentioned above,
much of the “revival in Russia” evangelism focused on eschatological
hope at the expense of practical, Bible-based knowledge on how to live
this life with meaning and purpose now.
Fifth, Russian Adventists should remember their history, particularly the fact that it was the graying minds that brought their country, the
USSR, to disaster and caused its disappearance. Gerontocracy is just as
dangerous as immaturity in leadership.
Finally, it is time to read anew Jesus’ parable regarding the old and
new wineskins. Jesus said, “No one puts new wine into old wineskins; or
else the new wine will burst the wineskins and be spilled, and the wineskins will be ruined. But new wine must be put into new wineskins, and
both are preserved. And no one, having drunk old wine, immediately desires new; for he says, ‘The old is better’” (Luke 5:37-39 NKJ). If this parable was true regarding Judaism during Jesus’ days, why would it not
apply also to 21st century Adventism in Russia? There is no shame in acknowledging the fact that in Adventism, there is both old and new wine,
and, perhaps, there are both old and new wineskins. It is time to develop
a locally meaningful Adventist “theology of change” that could help avert
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the very possible grim future the Seventh-day Adventist Church in Russia
will otherwise face.
There is a great need to look at Adventist theology and decide: What
are the key essentials that make us Adventists? Are they all equally Bible-based? How detailed should they be spelled out? In my view, these
essentials must transcend time, culture, and history. They should not be
too numerous, too complex, too specific, or too abstract. Yet, they must
be spiritually profound, practically applicable, well-articulated, and well
understood in each given time and culture. A good example of this approach is Acts 15:28, 29 where is says, “it seemed good to the Holy Spirit,
and to us [church leaders], to lay upon you [“the brethren who are of the
Gentiles”] no greater burden than these necessary things: that you abstain
from things offered to idols, from blood, from things strangled, and from
sexual immorality. If you keep yourselves from these, you will do well.”
Just as the Adventist pioneers were able to extract key essentials from
the Bible in the 19th century that shaped a new religious understanding, so
too must the Church today be more proactive in the ongoing task of seeking God and his will in and for a given culture and context. The members
at the grassroots level of the Church must have more freedom to articulate what they see in the Bible, how they understand it, and how they plan
to follow its precepts. There should be more spontaneity in theologizing
as well as in practicing what the Bible teaches. No doubt, the theological/doctrinal framework of the Church must be universally agreed upon.
At the same time, within that framework there must be enough room for
creative theological and missiological inputs from the local churches and
their believers.
Presently, many church members feel alienated from much of what
takes place in their church. There is a sense of alienation from the giving
and use of tithes and offerings, from the process of developing and elaborating the church’s strategies and plans, from the process of appointing
or moving local pastors, etc. These areas of alienation lead many church
members to feel alienated from the church’s mission. Eventually, this
leads to the costliest loss, the loss of ownership of mission, when people
no longer think and feel that it is their mission and their responsibility to
reach out and bring the gospel to all people. Without overcoming these
and other areas of alienation, there appears little hope for significant progress
of the Seventh-day Adventist Church in Russia in the foreseeable future.
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Conclusion
Being an international and highly diverse community of believers, the
world-wide Seventh-day Adventists Church has always struggled with
maintaining its identity in a fast-changing world. This is natural, and
much credit is to be given to several generations of church leaders for success in this regard. Nevertheless, after the seeds of Adventism have been
liberally sown all over the world and as the seeds have grown, it is time
to let those plants share more responsibility for their own future. Paternalism and top-down strategizing is no longer adequate to facilitate the
spiritual rejuvenation of local forms of Adventism.
To experience the refreshing power of the Spirit is clearly the work of
God. It is time to ask him to give us courage to re-think our Adventist message and identity both universally and locally. Otherwise, as it has been
demonstrated in this article, the Adventist Church will keep producing
one-sided results that simply do not have a future. This is at least true for
Russia. If an inspiring image of a “young Jesus” emerges in the heads and
hearts of people who claim to believe in him and who want to follow him,
most likely the result will be an emerging Adventism, renewed in the image and likeness of a “young Jesus.”

Works Cited
Bychkov, Denis. 2014. Tula Region Ministry of Education. Letter #16-01-14/396.
Office of Zaoksky Christian School of General Education.
Drumi, Yuri. 2008. The Trauma of Stalinism: Narratives, Nature, Cure. Saarbrücken,
Germany: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller.
Eberstadt, Nicholas. 2011. The Dying Bear: Russia’s Demographic Disaster.
Foreign Affairs 90, no. 6:95-108. http://aei.org/article/the-dying-bear-russias
-demographic-disaster (accessed 11 February 2014).
Elkner, Julie. 2005. Spiritual Security in Putin’s Russia. History and Policy. http://
www.historyandpolicy.org/papers/policy-paper-26.htmlhttp://www
.historyandpolicy.org/papers/policypaper-26.html (accessed 6 February
2014).
Euro-Asia Division. 2012. Ministerial Association Survey Report. Moscow, Russia.
________. 2013a. Euro-Asia Secretary’s Statistical Report Analysis. Moscow, Russia
________. 2013b. Euro-Asia Youth Department Report. Moscow, Russia.
Federal State Statistics Service. 2013. Russia in Figures―2013. http://www.gks
.ru/bgd/regl/b13_11/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d1/05-05.htm (accessed 11 January
2014).
Furman, D. E. 1992. Religion and Politics in Contemporary Mass Consciousness.
Issues in Philosophy 7:7-15.

Journal of Adventist Mission Studies
https://digitalcommons.andrews.edu/jams/vol13/iss2/9

24

Drumi: An Aging Church in an Aging Society: Russia

83

General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, Office of Archives, Statistics,
and Research. 2013. Euro-Asia Division (1991-Present). http://www
.adventiststatistics.org/ view_Chart.asp?FieldID=D10006& StatsType=FYR
&ChartType=Line&ColumnType =Statistical&StatsColumn=Churches&A
nalysisColumn=GrowthRate&StartYear=1991&EndYear=2010&submit=Bu
ild+Chart (accessed 9 January 2014).
Ghorshkov, Mikhail K., and Frants E. Shereghi. 2010. Molodezh Rossii:
Sotsiologicheskii portret [Youth in Russia: Sociological portrait]. 2nd ed.
Moscow, Russia: Tsentr sotsiologicheskogo prognozirovania i marketinga.
Glotov, M. B. 2012. National Security Risks Caused by Demographic Setting in the
Northern Regions of Russia. Sociology 1:36-46. http://www.journal.socio
.msu.ru/pdf/soc_mag-1_2012.pdf (accessed 11 February 2014).
Golova, A. G. 2011. Entrenchment of the Consumerism through the System of
Control over the Consumerist Behavior. Sociology 3:91-104.
Hirsch, Allan. 2006. The Forgotten Ways: Reactivating the Missional Church. Grand
Rapids, MI: Brazos Press.
Jackson, Richard, and Neil Howe. 2008. The Graying of the Great Powers: Demography
and Geopolitics in the 21st Century. Center for Statistics and International
Studies. http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080630_gai_ majorfindings.
pdf (accessed 15 December 2013).
Kaariainen, Kimmo, and D. E. Furman. 1997. Believers, Atheists, and Others:
Evolution of Russian Religiosity. Issues in Philosophy 6:35-52.
Kent, Anthony. 2013. Why Did They Leave? Why Might They Come Back? Findings
from a Global Survey of Seventh-day Adventists. General Conference
of Seventh-day Adventists, Office of Archives, Statistics, and Research.
http://www.adventistarchives.org/why-did-they-leave.pdf (accessed 12
February 2014).
Latsa, Alexandre. 2012. The Russian Demography from 1991 to 2012. Dissonance.
http://alexandrelatsa.ru/2012/02/the-russian-demography-from-1991-to
-2012/ (accessed 17 December 2013).
Ministry of Labor and Social Protection. 2013. Report. http://www.rosmintrud.ru/
social/demography/46 (accessed February 24, 2014).
Osipov, G. V., and L. L. Rybakovsky, eds. 2009. “Demographicheskoe razvitie
Rossii v XXI veke” [Demographic Development of Russia in 21st Century].
Moscow, Russia: Econ-Inform.
Pension Fund of the Russian Federation. 2014. Information on Maternity (family)
Capital. http://www.pfrf.ru/ot_en/ (accessed 12 February 2014).
Prokhorov, B. B. 1998. Health of the Russian Population. In Russia in the
Surrounding World. Moscow, Russia: IIUEPS Press. http://rus-stat.ru/eng/
index.php?id=27&vid=1&year=1998 (accessed 11 February 2014).
Putin, V. 2007. Kontseptsia demograficheskoi politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii na
period do 2025 goda [The concept of the demographic policy of the Russian
Federation until 2025). Moscow, Russia. http://spbdeti.org/id314 (accessed
10 January 2014).
Rudenko, Boris. 2007. A Disappearing Russia. Notes from All-Russia Conference
on Demography. Science and Life, no. 1. http://www.nkj.ru/archive/
articles/8665/ (accessed 11 February 2014).
2017, vol. University,
13 no. 2
Published by Digital Commons @ Andrews
2017

25

84

Journal of Adventist Mission Studies, Vol. 13 [2017], No. 2, Art. 9

Sahlin, Monte. 2013. Exit Interviews: An International Survey of Dropouts from
the Seventh-day Adventist Church. General Conference of Seventhday Adventists, Office of Archives, Statistics, and Research. http://www
.adventistarchives.org/plenary-sessions#.UvxTuoU7kyY (accessed 12
February 2014).
Semenova, V. G., A. E. Ivanova, and E. V. Dubrovina, eds. 2005. Smertnost’ rossiiskoi
molodezhi: dolgosrochnye trendy i sovremennye osobennosti [Mortality
among Russian youth: long-term trends and present day features]. In
Rossiyskaia molodezh: problemy i reshenia [Russian Youth: Problems and
Solutions], 217-232. Moscow, Russia: Tsentr sotsialnogo prognozirovaniya.
Shterin, Marat S. 1998. New Religions, Cults and Sects in Russia: A Critique and
Brief Account of the Problem. Moscow, Russia: Center for Studies on New
Religions. http://www.cesnur.org/testi/Shterin.htm (accessed 9 February
2014).
System Garant. 2013. Legislation with Comments. Moscow, Russia. http://english
.garant.ru/ (accessed 11 February 2014).
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). 2010. Molodezh v Rossii. 2010 [Youth
in Russia. 2010]. Мoscow, Russia: Informatsionno-izdatelskiy tsentr
“Statistika Rossii.”
West Russian Union Conference. 2014. Sabbath School and Personal Ministries
Department
Report. Moscow Region, Russian Federation.
White, Ellen. 1974. The Ministry of Healing. Mountain View, CA: Pacific Press.
Zakharov, Sergei V., and Elena I. Ivanova. 1994. Fertility Decline and Recent Changes
in Russia: On the Threshold of the Second Demographic Transition. RAND
Corporation. http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF124/CF124.
chap2.html (accessed 10 February 2014).
Zaoksky Adventist Seminary and Institute. 2013. Enrollment Office Report.
Zaoksky, Russia: Adventist Seminary and Institute.

After receiving a PhD from Andrews University (2008) Yuri
Drumi has been serving at Zaosky University in Russia. As a
missiologist he keeps working on building bridges through
publications, lectures, sermons, and personal witnessing
so that the gospel (evangel) of Jesus Christ can more easily be
communicated with people in contemporary Russian culture.

Journal of Adventist Mission Studies
https://digitalcommons.andrews.edu/jams/vol13/iss2/9

26

